LA VIDA OPERATIVA: THE TRANSCENDENTAL DISCLOSURE
OF OPERATIVELY FUNCTIONING LIFE

LA VIDA OPERATIVA: SU DEVELOMEN TO TRASCENDENTAL

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RESUMEN

En la obra de Husserl, la concepción de la subjetividad “operativa” o “funcionante”, “actuante”, tiene muchas y muy ricas significaciones, pero en la tradición fenomenológica, hay todavía una interpretación muy importante de “funcionante” como equivalente de “anónima”, no temática. ¿Cómo evidenciar la vida operativa misma si “operativa” tiene solamente la significación de “esencialmente anónima”, inaccesible para la experiencia? Es necesario otro camino para hacer la vida operativa temática, y resolver el problema del acceso fenomenológico, no por la “reflexión” según el paradigma visual, sino por un modo alternativo de acceso según el paradigma de la conciencia cinestésica o conciencia de las capacidades.

Palabras clave: Husserl | Funcionante | Operativo/va | Anonimato | Reflexión

ABSTRACT

The notion of “operatively functioning” subjectivity has many rich nuances in Husserl’s work, but within the phenomenological tradition, there is an influential interpretation that takes “operatively functioning” as equivalent to “anonymous,” unthematic. Yet how can we bring operatively functioning life to evidential itself-givenness if “operatively functioning” can only mean “essentially anonymous,” experientially inaccessible? We need another way to resolve the problem of phenomenological access to operatively functioning life, not through “reflection” according to a visual paradigm, but through an alternative mode of access according to the paradigm of kinaesthetic consciousness or capability-consciousness.

Keywords: Husserl | Functioning | Operative | Anonymity | Reflection
La intencionalidad viva sostiene, prescribe, determina en la práctica todo mi comportamiento, incluso mi comportamiento conforme al pensamiento natural; así resulte de ella el ser o la ilusión, así pueda incluso no ser tématica, no estar revelada por cuanto funge como intencionalidad viva, sustraída a mi saber.¹

The terms “function” (Funktion) and “functioning” (Fungieren, Funktionieren) frequently appear in Husserl’s work, with the latter used as a noun, a verb, and an adjective. However, he draws upon these terms without formally defining them or discussing them in detail. My purpose here is to provide a working description of Husserl’s own notion of the functioning, in contrast to an influential interpretation of this notion developed from the 1930s to the 1960s and still widely accepted today. After briefly introducing the latter interpretation and considering some questions of terminology and translation, I shall sketch a portrait of Husserl’s own notion before addressing the problem of bringing the operatively functioning to itself-givenness² and concluding with some remarks on the significance of my findings. Although I cannot definitively resolve all of the relevant issues within the limits of the present research report, my hope is to bring Husserl’s own voice more fully into a conversation already underway while encouraging others to join this conversation as well.


² I follow Dorion Cairns, Guide for Translating Husserl, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, 102, in translating Selbstgegebenheit as “itself-givenness” (rather than as “self-givenness”) in order to avoid the typical connotation of “self” in such English compounds as “self-awareness,” where “self” refers to the subjective side rather than to the mode of givenness in which what is intentionally meant is given as “it, itself” (es selbst).
§ 1. THE TERM AND THE TRADITION

In his 1972 monograph on intentionality, Mohanty presents “operative intentionality” as a general title for the later Husserl’s concern with intentionalities other than acts, including passive synthesis, horizon intentionality, genetic constitution, prepredicative intentionality, unconscious intentionality, and anonymous intentionality. He summarizes his exposition by citing the passage from Formal and Transcendental Logic quoted as the epigraph to this essay, emphasizing that the formula “consciousness-of...” is a simplification of a complex process whose achievements we experience even while remaining unaware of the many different modes of intentionality involved in these achievements—modes that may initially operate unthematically or “anonymously,” but can be disclosed by intentional analysis. However, the very same passage from Husserl’s 1929 Formal and Transcendental Logic had already triggered a chain of interpretations progressively evolving through articles Fink published in 1933 and 1939; Merleau-Ponty’s 1945 Phénoménologie de la perception; Brand’s Welt, Ich und Zeit, published in 1955; Fink’s 1957 article on operative concepts; and Held’s treatment of the standing-streaming life of primal temporalization in Lebendige Gegenwart, which appeared in 1966. This interpretative tradition culminates in the claim that in the end, operative intentionality is essentially and inescapably anonymous, eluding phenomenological disclosure in principle. But if there is indeed an impenetrable anonymity at the heart of conscious life, this threatens the very project of phenomenology as a rigorous science based on the itself-givenness of what is to be investigated, since the deep structures of experience would remain inaccessible, their ineluctable anonymity

4 “The living intentionality carries me along; it predelineates; it determines me practically in my entire comportment, including the comportment of my natural thinking, whether this yields being or illusion. The living intentionality does all that, even though, as living functioning, it may be non-thematic, undisclosed, and thus beyond my ken”—Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1969, 235. Trans. Dorion Cairns (trans. altered).
5 Mohanty, op. cit., 122.
foreclosing any possibility of evidential\textsuperscript{7} itself-givenness—leading to Landgrebe’s claim that phenomenological reflection simply cannot reach the constitutive depth-dimensions it aims at.\textsuperscript{8} Already we can sense a possible tension between the two main moments shaping the way operative intentionality is understood: on the one hand, it refers to a performing (leisten) that achieves something, while on the other hand, this achievement happens without the active participation of an I or ego and without the experiencer being aware that these operative performances are taking place. I shall return to the issue of such “anonymous” processes in § 3 below, after examining how Husserl himself makes use of the notion of the operatively functioning (§ 2 below). First, however, some terminological considerations are appropriate.

Husserl’s own technical notion is always expressed in the language of “function” and “functioning” with “operieren” reserved for other contexts, as when referring, for example, to metaphysics operating with countersensical “things in themselves” (1/182). How, then, did references to “operative” intentionality gain such currency? This apparently emerged in the French tradition. It is true that in the 1931 Méditations cartésiennes, the French translators hardly seem to treat “functioning” as a technical term at all; it is typically translated in terms of something “playing a role,” although “fonction” and “fonctional” also appear, while “opéraït” and “opérant” translate Husserl’s “operieren” in contexts having nothing to do with the technical notion of functioning intentionality. But in 1945, Merleau-Ponty translates “fungierende Intentionalität” as “l’intentionnalité opérante,”\textsuperscript{9} and Fink’s 1957 essay similarly uses the German cognate (“operative”) in its title.\textsuperscript{10} The interplay between “functioning” and “operative”—terms often used synonymously today—also surfaces in the close relation of the notion of functioning to that of achievement/accomplishment (Leistung) as seen in, for example, the title of § 54a of the Crisis, which refers to “fungierend-leistende Subjekte.” Enrico Filippini’s Italian translation (which uses cognates for Husserl’s references to the functioning) renders this phrase “soggetti fungenti-operanti,” while Julia Iribarne’s Spanish translation has “sujetos funcionantes y operantes.” Similarly, a reference in § 20 of Cartesian Meditations to “die verborgenen konstitutiven Leistungen” becomes “les opérations constitutives latentes” in the French and “igualmente ocultas

\textsuperscript{7} I follow Cairns, op. cit., 49, in reserving “evident” for noematic contexts and using “evidential” in noetic contexts.


\textsuperscript{9} Merleau-Ponty, op. cit., xiii, 478; cf. 490.

las operaciones constitutivas” in the translation by José Gaos. Mario Presas, however, translates the phrase “las efectuaciones constitutivas encubiertas,” while in his translation of Formal and Transcendental Logic, Cairns uses “effective” in translating phrases like “leistenden Lebens” and “leistende Subjektivität” (17/253). This sense of something being effectively “realized” or “carried out” has a dynamic connotation also found in Miguel García-Baró’s translation of the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, which in some cases departs from the terminology of “función” used by Gaos in the first four meditations, relying instead on “actuar”—translating “fungierenden Leib,” for example, as “cuerpo actuante” in § 61; Presas, however, translates this phrase with “cuerpo orgánico funcional” and retains the language of “función” and “funcionante” throughout. Meanwhile, “actuar” also shows up in Luis Villoro’s translation of Formal and Transcendental Logic—but in contexts having to do with Wirkung (effect), e.g., “actuaba vivamente” for “lebendig wirkende” (17/8) and “actuando” for “sich auswirkenden” (17/20), phrases Cairns translates into English by using the word “operative.” Villoro typically uses “función” for “Funktion” and various forms of “fungir” for the corresponding forms of “fungieren,” although “mit fungiert” (17/216) is translated as “tiene un papel.” But although “Leistung” is sometimes “operación” and sometimes “resultado,” “leistendes Leben” (17/20, 253) is “vida operante,” while “in Vollzug” (17/38) becomes “opera.”

All of these variations are highly suggestive, and point to the fact that we are not merely dealing with terms, but must also consult the experiential evidence fulfilling these “empty” words. We might even speak of a constellation of terms continually resurfacing in the course of the conversation concerning operatively functioning life. If “fungierende,” “leistende,” and “wirkende” emphasize what I have termed the moment of “achievement,” the moment of the “unthematic” or “anonymous” would imply the corresponding notion of “thematizing” via “reflection”; the terms “latent” and “patent” appear as well, and the discussion of the operatively functioning also raises issues of how the term “constitution” is to be understood.11 In what follows, my main focus will be Husserl’s terms “function” and “functioning,” but always as informed by the atmosphere of the other notions mentioned. Finally, with regard to my title, I should say that the phrase “la vida operativa” is modeled on Agustín Serrano de Haro’s phrase “la capacidad operativa,” meaning an acquired capability that is tacit/sedimented on the one hand, yet effective/at one’s disposal on the other;12 in this way I mean to honor both the “anonymity” moment and the “achievement” moment proper to operatively functioning life while leaving the way open for more to be said.


about it. Here the term “life” is not meant to connote either the “life-philosophy” of Dilthey (or anyone else) or life as conceived by the biologist (cf. 6/315), but refers to Husserl in two ways. First, as the scope of his analyses increases, one can sense a corresponding broadening of the way the experiencer is typically characterized, moving from the “ego” to “subjectivity” to “life” as a dynamic process that is effectively equated with functioning (cf. 42/70). In addition, however, I am referring to Husserl’s notion of a specifically transcendental life and experience, and this on methodological grounds (rather than to defend any species of idealism): my investigation is carried out within the transcendental-phenomenological epoché and reduction, taking the correlational a priori (6/§ 46), in its full concretion, as my sphere of inquiry and disclosing certain aspects of its intricacy as best as I can—not merely in service of a theoretical interest, but because as the findings of such investigations flow back into the lifeworld (6/214, 267f.; 29/77ff.), they may be of practical value as well.

§ 2. FUNCTION AND FUNCTIONING IN HUSSERL

Anyone attempting to trace the way Husserl makes use of his technical notion of function/functioning will find ample textual material, particularly in the Forschungsmanuskripte13 (although there are many relevant passages in works published in his lifetime).14 In fact, there are hundreds of examples, and the problem is first to distinguish technical from non-technical uses of the term(s), then to discern the main dimensions along which the technical notion moves. Here I cannot hope to present an exhaustive account, but can only provide a preliminary “portrait” of Husserl’s disclosure of operatively functioning life. I shall proceed by identifying senses of the terms “function” and “functioning” to be set aside; suggesting some of the precedents for the development of this notion during the period I am concerned with (1917–1937); indicating the significance of certain 1917 and 1917/18 texts for Husserl’s subsequent work; and sketching some of the most important themes that emerge when one sets the received interpretation out of play and attempts to grasp Husserl’s own technical working notion of “function” and “functioning.”

13 See Elizabeth A. Behnke, “Husserl’s Forschungsmanuskripte and the Open Horizon of Phenomenological Practice,” Studia Phaenomenologica 14 (2014), 285–306, on the appropriate use of these materials in pursuing phenomenology as a rigorous science.

14 In what follows, I am not attempting to document every instance of a specific use of “function” or “functioning”; instead, page references merely refer to selected examples.
To this end I shall set aside everyday uses of the word “function,” as when Husserl refers to the various ways the function of philosophy for humankind has been understood (HM9/210, 215; 6/199, 336, 428); I shall similarly set aside the notion of the philosopher as “functionary” of humankind (6/15, 72). Moreover, I shall set aside “function” as a mathematical term (cf. 3-1/196), along with various notions of functional dependency, such as causal dependency. Finally, I shall also set aside passages concerned with “normal” and “abnormal” bodily functioning, even though not all such passages are concerned with physiological or psychophysical functioning, and even though this normal/abnormal contrast may have played a role in Husserl’s development of the notion of the functioning body: the disruptions of normal functioning not only make us aware of what we had previously taken for granted, but may motivate interest in the invariant of which “normal” and “abnormal” are both variants—namely, bodily functioning per se.

And there are other precedents or influences that may have contributed to Husserl’s technical notion as well, even if he explicitly distances his notion from contributions of earlier thinkers such as Kant on the functions of spontaneity (42/170; cf. 25/141) or Stumpf on psychic functions (3-1/199). But the most important precedent for the later notion of functioning is § 86 of Ideas I, “Die funktionellen Probleme,” especially when this is read in conjunction with the first five lectures of the 1907 Dingvorlesungen. In § 86, “function” is identified with “constitution,” and more precisely, with the constitution of objects as identical transtemporal unities; as Husserl puts it, the point of view of “function” encompasses the phenomenological sphere as a whole, guiding all its investigations and defining its unique set of transcendental problems. The key, however, is what the functional point of view provides an alternative to: namely, a concept of consciousness in terms of (psychic) “contents” such as sensations (3-1/196, 198). This in turn recalls Husserl’s insistence in the 1907 lectures (and elsewhere) that consciousness is not some kind of container like a box or a bag within which lived experiences are to be found (2/12, 71f., 74f.; 10/279; 11/319, 321; 17/239, 363). Instead, it is a matter of constitution as a complex, dynamic process, and “when constitution thus replaces containment, the transcendental dimension steps onto the stage in its place.”

It is against this backdrop, then, that we find not only the emphasis on consciousness as function in two texts drafted between February and April 1917 (meant for Kant-Studien but never published), but the emergence of genetic phenomenology in

16 See “Phänomenologie und Psychologie” (25/82–124) and especially “Phänomenologie und Erkenntnistheorie” (25/125–206).
the Bernau manuscripts of 1917/18, including references to the functioning I that is not an object, but lies in a new dimension as “das Leistende für alle (...) Leistungen” (33/278) within the “living function” (lebendiger Funktion) of the dynamic temporal becoming (33/170) that is the primal process of transcendental life (33/253, 267). The reference to “living” function recalls Husserl’s notion of the living present, which has become widely known since Held’s Lebendige Gegenwart. However, an examination of the analyses of passive synthesis offered in the lecture courses known under that title reveal an astonishing number of locutions applying the adjective “lebendig” to a variety of nouns. And in the 1917 Kant-Studien texts it is clear that the notion of the functioning “life” of consciousness stands in contrast to an approach concerned with “dead” matters such as complexes of contents lying in some sort of container (25/198, 371; cf. 3-1/198), confirming Husserl’s commitment to a model whereby consciousness-of is essentially “function,” comprising numerous modes of functioning, all centered around a functioning I and teleologically ordered so as to function constitutively, with the principal achievement (Leistung) being the constitution of transcendent reality and its distinctive regions (25/182, 192; cf. 188, 190, 197). How is this commitment realized across the explorations of the genetic depths of subjective life carried out over the next twenty years?

Husserl’s appeal to the functioning can be addressed under a number of headings. Perhaps the first point to mention is that “someone” is always implicated in functioning, even when such functioning is unthematic or non-actional (without the active engagement of the I). In other words, Husserl’s notion of functioning intentionality implies a functioning I, functioning subjectivity, or functioning life (“fungierende Leben”—HM8/36; cf. 39/401), but also refers to a functioning body (and especially to a body functioning kinaesthetically), with the body (Leib) understood as a bodily subjectivity (more on this below). Yet he also speaks of functioning co-subjects (29/61), of a functioning total subjectivity (39/628; cf. 574, 625), of functioning intersubjectivity (42/79), of a constantly functioning we-subjectivity (6/111; cf. 29/60), of a socially functioning life (42/476; cf. 11/434), and even of transcendental intersubjectivity as absolutely functioning generativity (cf. HM8/391, 439, 442).

Next we must note that the work of “functioning” per se is carried out by many different types of functions. In the 1917 Kant-Studien drafts, Husserl merely takes over a received “inventory” of functions, including feeling and willing as well as cognitive functions (25/195f.; cf. HM9/109, 154). But as the notion of functioning develops, references to specific types of functions are expressed in terms drawn from his own phenomenological investigations. At one point a “function” is simply equated with an intentional act (33/247). But numerous nuances emerge as well—for example, apperception and association are treated as specific functions, as are empathy and recollec-
tion, while retention and protention are characterized as non-self-sufficient types of function within concrete perception (11/234f.). Moreover, various functions of empty objectivation (Leervorstellung) can be identified (11/73); evidences are also termed “functions” functioning within the intentional nexus (17/291), including the particular synthetic functions at work in confirmation (11/66, 88ff.; cf. 29/92), while the I-pole functions to hold the experiential object in its grasp during the course of further explanation (6/174). Then association (along with awakening) is said to be a universal functional form of passive genesis (11/76; 39/34), while one primal function of the active I is to grasp and make patent what passive functioning has already accomplished (11/64; cf. HM8/46). In fact, although action is said to be a universal function (42/349), no activity can function without such passivity (11/92; 17/319), all of which rests on the streaming life-ground (1/99) provided by primal, ultimately functioning temporalization (I shall return to the latter below). And if the basic mode of functioning is to be characterized as ontification/objectivation in the sense of constituting what is other than the experiencer (HM8/198), the most encompassing mode of functioning might be said to be world-constitution (6/115, 187).

However, we must not let the possibility of distinguishing various types of functioning obscure Husserl’s key notion of co-functioning, which takes various forms. When the I exercises its spontaneous functions, for instance, this is less a “ray” than a “system” of functions (33/257), and no act is isolated, for there are always co-functioning horizons and acceptances (6/152, 185; cf. 257), along with a hidden genesis constantly co-functioning in the “finished” sense (17/216, and cf. 42/64, 442; 39/198). Yet these functions are not simply there side by side, as it were, but are completely interwoven with one another (11/71, 95, 238; 6/214). Then there is Husserl’s emphasis on the body constantly co-functioning as perceptual organ (11/13; 15/280) with various specific organs functioning together as one (15/264f.; NR/32, 217, 223), exchanging functions (15/320), etc. Finally, world-constitution is a matter of intersubjective co-functioning (15/178; 6/191; 39/574): we are always functioning together in some way (6/111, 459; cf. 39/625, 627) as a “fungierende Allsubjektivität” (39/628).

Although the survey I have offered so far is by no means exhaustive,17 one theme already mentioned deserves further discussion: fungierende Leiblichkeit.18 There are many references in Husserl to the body functioning in perception, but he also speaks of the body functioning in action, pointing out that perceptual kinaestheses and prac-

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17 For instance, I have not addressed the issue of the mundanization of transcendentally functioning subjectivity, nor have I traced Husserl’s many references to something “functioning as” something back to the correlative subjective functioning.

tical kinaestheses are not two different sorts of kinaestheses, but two modes of function (39/396f.), and he also refers to the body functioning expressively (14/491; 15/656, 664; HM8/401n.2) as well as to the body functioning as the experiential center of the surrounding world. While acknowledging that the body functions in affectivity as well as action, he tends to emphasize the bodily intentionality (9/197) at work in kinaesthetic functioning. This is usually expressed in terms of “holding-sway” (Walten) in a body that serves as an “organ” (13/440; 14/61, 118). However, Husserl does not mean “organ” in a physiological sense (29/19f.); my kinaesthetically functioning body is the directly experienced “means-through-which” (cf. 39/247) I hold-sway in the world (11/434; 1/128; 14/58f., 309f.; 39/632f.; NR/31), and it is on this basis that I can experience others as functioning likewise (1/146, 242; 14/60, 117f.; 29/19f.; 39/426, 618). But only I can truly experience my own kinaesthetic functioning (11/434, and cf. 1/140; 29/21; 39/624) in the unique mode of “I move” (NR/27; 14/447): what is at stake is not an experience “of” the body, but experiencing myself livingly functioning “in” my own kinaesthetic powers and possibilities (HM8/157n.1; 39/253, 632). These powers and possibilities may, of course, vary with aging, illness, or injury, but some degree of kinaesthetic functioning must still be in play for the world to be there for me at all (HM8/157f.). And although it is true that the holding-sway I and the kinaestheses through which I engage the world are not necessarily thematic while I am occupied with things, tasks, and others (HM8/339; 39/14), I can become “awake for” my own kinaesthetic functioning (HM8/328; NR/25), noting, for instance, that as I deploy my kinaesthetic possibilities, I move along a multidimensional kinaesthetic system of possible “positions” and move with a certain degree of “energy” (39/397). It is true that I can make a functioning hand into an “object” by touching it with the other hand (1/128; 15/298; 39/639). And my optically given body is readily naturalized as an “organ” in the physiological sense (NR/226). But the kinaesthetic functioning of the nonoptical body (NR/217) and the certainty of being-able-to function through these means (29/20) are not given to me in the way “objects” are: here what is at stake is the mode of givenness of capabilities (11/14f.; 15/619, 621; 42/452). If we then inquire what such functioning means, we find that it is truly subjective in a unique way (39/253)—a new type of subjectivity (39/632) that can no longer be accommodated.

19 Husserl tends to take the kinaestheses as egoic (13/436; 14/450; HM8/326; 6/110; 39/616, 633; 42/75) and often appeals to examples of voluntary movement, but clearly recognizes instinctual and habitual functioning as well; in fact, he takes even involuntary movement as belonging to the “ich bewege mich,” in contrast to my being moved mechanically from the outside (HM4/184; 14/447n.1).

20 In addition to the possibility of thematizing my kinaesthetic functioning at will by suffusing it with awareness from within, I may also find my own bodily life suddenly taking center stage as an obstacle in the lived experience of resistance or as a locus of pain—see Joaquín Xirau, “Presencia del cuerpo,” and Agustín Serrano de Haro, “Atención y dolor. Análisis fenomenológico,” both in Cuerpo vivido, Agustín Serrano de Haro (Ed.), Madrid, Encuentro, 2010, 87–98; 123–61.
under the old assumption that ascribes subjectivity to mind/psyche and denies it to the body. In this way what Rudolf Bernet identifies as two of Husserl’s most important contributions—the notion of functioning intentionality and the notion of a thoroughly bodily subjectivity—merge in his descriptions of “kinaesthetically functioning corporeality” (6/109) as constantly functioning constitutively (15/662). There is, of course, much more to be said about the genetic acquisition of functioning kinaesthetic possibilities; the coordination among specific kinaesthetic systems so that each system supports (or inhibits) the main thrust of the action; the effects of sedimented historical/cultural styles of kinaesthetic functioning on artifacts and practices (and vice versa); and so on. But let us return to the question of the main dimensions along which Husserl’s discussion of operatively functioning life move. I will approach this question by addressing efficacy, world-openness, and actionality, then by considering the dynamic character of functioning and the issue of its anonymity.

I have already mentioned the close connection between fungieren and leisten (along with wirken); functioning is a “performing” that yields an “achievement”: it has an “effect,” something comes about by virtue of it. More specifically, functioning has constitutive efficacy, and within the transcendental-phenomenological reduction, we can trace the ready-made objects we experience back to such subjective operations as passive synthesis, apperception-as, etc. In functioning, then, something is “at work” or “in play” (whether it is a matter of Urstiftung or of the coming into play of something already instituted), and something (an identical unity, a process, a mode of givenness, etc.) is thereby “effected.” Yet this happens in such a way that a profound relationality between the experiencer and that which is other than the experiencer is thereby established. This should not be thought as if two already existing things somehow come into relation; instead, operatively functioning life is defined from the start as much by its world-openness (exemplified in affectivity) as by its fundamental world-constituting contribution (cf. HM8/199). Functioning life, in other words, partners something other than itself rather than swallowing everything up into its own “immanence” as the container model of consciousness would have it. At the same time, however, there are variations in the degree to which (and the mode in which) this constitutive efficacy involves the active engagement of the I. A function may be exercised spontaneously (cf. 33/248), as when I deliberately actualize certain practical or perceptual kinaesthetic possibilities; it may originally have been performed actionally, as when I am learning

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new moves, then become non-actional as the skill becomes habitual; it may have arisen non-actionally through original instinct, but the I may still be able to engage in it actively (at least to some degree), as when I deliberately hold my breath (14/447; 39/630); or it may lie beyond any active intervention of the I, as with primal temporalization. And these variations along the dimension of actionality may well flow from one to the other, as when an associative reawakening motivates a deliberate act of presentation. Husserl expresses some doubt about calling functioning an “activity,” since functioning lies on the “side” of the “I,” as it were, but the I per se is not always involved as currently active agent (NR/31). In order to convey the “process”-character of functioning implied in the term “activity” while avoiding the implication that an I is always actively engaged, we might speak of the efficacy of functioning as a dynamic efficacy. But this brings us to complex issues concerning temporality.

We might begin by asking “when” functioning functions (although this way of posing the question will eventually prove inadequate). Functioning is often thought as currently actual (HM8/45): it is living functioning (42/404; 33/168), in the living primal present (11/387). But sometimes Husserl mentions an initial coming into function (for example, instincts coming into function at birth or “when the time comes”—42/120, HM8/442); a structural coming into function (for example, hyletic contents functioning once grasping enters into actual function—33/169f.); or an episodic coming into function (for example, when an I-function reactivates a previous function—HM8/46n.2—or when certain kinaesthetic possibilities are set in play—15/299). Then there is a prolonging of functioning in a polythetic act where previous moments still function (even across interruption) such that this “still” functioning is a unique modification over and above retention (HM8/45f.). More profoundly, however, there is what is constantly in function—for instance, the constitution of hyletic moments as linked in coexistence and succession (11/158), the functioning of association and apperception (39/495; HM8/252), the functioning I (6/208; HM8/3), the functioning body (15/497), or the world-consciousness belonging to the functioning (cf. 29/74f.)—as well as what has always already functioned, including passivity as the basis for the functioning of an active I (HM8/187), holding sway as the primal praxis functioning in advance for all other praxis (15/328), and primal temporalization (cf. 39/10f.). And there are other examples of the ongoing efficacy of past functioning, such as an unfulfilled drive ongoingly functioning in the substratum of one’s life and crying out for fulfillment (42/126); basic drives still functioning indestructibly even when taking on a “higher” form (42/129); or “finished” unities into whose genesis we can inquire to disclose the hidden moments of sense essentially co-functioning in them (17/216), perhaps even functioning across the span of a living-streaming generativity (29/62). At the same time, there is also future-oriented functioning, as with apperceptive predelineation. Yet all such talk of past
or future—or indeed, of the “when” of functioning in any sense—requires the functioning of the originally constituting time-consciousness whereby individual acts receive their place in an ordered flow of “before” and “after.” And this in turn requires the effective performance of ultimately functioning temporality, of the nunc stans as the primal-original welling-up (Urquellen) of the next “now” (HM8/8), which is not itself “in” time (HM8/12) since it is temporali zing and not temporalized (HM8/197). On the one hand, the ultimate “depths” (8/168; 34/168; HM8/297; 6/186) of this primal life, which is not yet consciousness-of (33/251) but a continual arising and passing-away (33/267), are sometimes linked with a primal I (HM8/197), although Husserl also notes that it should not be named “I” since it is not an object or an entity, but “functioning” (33/278). On the other hand, however, he also speaks of the nunc stans as anonymous (HM8/8). Moreover, primal temporalization is on the one hand often characterized as unthematic (HM8/305), while on the other hand it is described as available to awareness originaliter (HM8/7) in a consciousness of transition (Übergang—33/47, 167).

Once again, then, the notion of the operatively functioning is marked by a tension between achievement and anonymity. And although my survey so far has attempted to demonstrate the richness and range of Husserl’s appeal to the operatively functioning, it is time to turn to the issue of anonymity that the received interpretation so forcefully emphasizes.

We must immediately acknowledge that there is more than one anonymity at stake here.23 The first might be termed naive-mundane anonymity. Experience in the natural attitude is “blind” to its own functioning (6/209; cf. 17/218); the I for whom everything is an object over-against the I is itself hidden, unthematic (HM8/16), and its anonymous functioning is only disclosed through the transcendental-phenomenological epochē and reduction.24 Such disclosure it is not merely a matter of a shift of attention from the object given in straightforward experience to the subjective processes disclosed in reflection, but a shift in attitude (HM8/16; 39/23, 530; 29/69): the ready-made themes of mundane experience in the pregiven world become clues to uncover the correlative pregiving constitutive performances.25 This version of anonymity is primarily concerned with revealing transcendence as an achievement of operative intentionality in its basic world-constituting, objectivating function (6/416). Once it is clear that what stands over-against us as an object does so in correlation with our own functioning (29/92), however, a second anonymity emerges when our

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23 Both Brand, op. cit., and Held, op. cit., acknowledge this; see especially Held, op. cit., 120ff.
interest moves to functioning subjectivity as such and we attempt to penetrate its “phenomenological depths” (HM8/407). But the problem is that reflecting upon this functioning life makes it into an object while the currently functioning process of reflection remains anonymous (HM8/2), as if the effect of the primal mode of functioning—namely, to constitute something other-than-itself—is to prevent any disclosure of this very functioning in the act; it remains hidden precisely because it is the living performance itself rather than a constituted object (34/251). In this way the primal stream always remains extra-thematic (34/183) even while a past moment of this life is thematized. And the problem becomes even more acute in the case of ultimately functioning temporalization as the primal upwelling of the new now in contrast to the coherently ordered stream of before and after it makes possible: if by virtue of its own operation reflection effectively modifies the originally functioning, making it into a past, temporally individuated “object,” it can never reach the primal source that is not itself an object and not itself “in” time (HM8/12). This, then, is the problem that leads the received interpretation to equate “functioning” with “ineluctable anonymity,” thereby frustrating the central phenomenological task of disclosing operatively functioning life in all its depths and dimensions (cf. 6/148). How can this dilemma be resolved?

§ 3. ANONYMITY AND ACCESSIBILITY

Issues concerning reflection are widely discussed in the secondary literature, and it is beyond the scope of this essay to review this material. Instead, I shall concentrate first on what makes reflection problematic, then on ways to address this problem.

Reflection is first of all characterized in terms of a direction: whereas “straightforward” experience is directed toward the world and its multifarious types of objects (14/57f.), reflection goes “against the grain” (39/15n.2), turning back to focus on sub-

jective life itself. In doing so, however, it establishes a distance in principle between
the reflecting I and the reflected-upon experience: namely, a temporal distance be-
tween the currently reflecting I and a past moment of its life. This is sometimes under-
stood as linked with a problem of infinite regress, since a new, currently “anonymous”
act of reflection is needed to thematize the initial reflective act, then yet another is re-
quired to thematize the second reflection, and so on. But in addition, reflection alters
the lived experience it reflects upon (1/72), changing it into an object even though as
functioning, it was quite precisely not an object-over-against, but the primal life-to-
whom objects can be given (25/89; 33/277; 42/57). In some texts, Husserl does not
seem to have any problem with reflection, asserting, for instance, that we can consult
the style of our own experience at any time (17/240f.), reflectively thematizing the
anonymous (17/185) and uncovering its constitutive performances (17/283), directly
“seeing” it in its performing (17/251; cf. 3-1/§§ 77–79). But there are also texts sup-
porting the received interpretation’s emphasis on irredeemable anonymity. How does
Husserl himself negotiate the problems involved in thematizing what is—at least initially—unthematic?

In the first place, much of Husserl’s work does not directly take subjectivity as an
object, but addresses it only indirectly, taking the object as leading clue (Leitfaden)
and inquiring back (rückfragen) from there into the correlative performances of the
functioning subjective life for whom objects are given (1/§ 21). Moreover, Husserl is
working eidetically. Let us accordingly consider the lived experience of carrying out
eidetic description. I may well begin by reflecting on a past phase of my life in which I
experienced a certain object. Immediately, however, I take this not as a “past,” tem-
porally individuated moment, but as “an” example of experiencing “this sort of” ob-
ject, and consider it among other possible examples without regard to the temporal or
ontic status of any of them. Suppose that I then attempt to write out a description.
What happens next? I must test my description against the matters themselves, tur-
ning once again to “an” example to see if matters are as I say they are. At this point, I
am oriented toward the future: will the empty words of my description be confirmed in
the fulfilling experiential evidence? What is at stake here is not a “reflection” that can
only contemplate a past over a distance that such reflection inevitably opens up, but a
“pro-flection” that is interested in what has not yet happened rather than an already
settled past that reflection merely “recapitulates.”27 When Husserl speaks of the iter-
ativity of reflection, then, he is speaking of an invariant atemporal structure, not of the
infinite regress entailed in repeated temporally individuated acts that can never reach
the current reflection, and he relies on syntheses of identity to restore unity to the I
“split” into reflecting and reflected upon (8/89ff.).

27 Waldenfels, op. cit., 102.
Husserl also recognizes subtleties in styles of awareness, noting, for instance, that I live in my anger without making it into an object over-against me (HMB/114). Moreover, as already mentioned, the primal living-streaming is “originaliter bewußt,” but not in the manner in which we are aware of an intentional object (HMB/7, 338); we are aware of our experiencing life, but we do not experience it in the manner proper to an object that is to be “known” (25/89). In his lectures on inner time-consciousness, Husserl still uses the language of “intentionality” to describe the peculiar intentionality through which the flow is aware of itself, in contrast to the intentionality whereby subjectivity is conscious of an intentional object (10/§ 39). As mentioned, however, he later fine-tunes his descriptions and speaks of a primal consciousness of transition (Übergangsbewußtsein) in which the fulfillment of a protention comes to awareness without reflective distance (33/47, 167). And there is one more clue in a distinction Husserl makes between the subjectivity of sensations and the subjectivity of acts (4/317; cf. HMB/197). But in order to pursue this clue it is necessary to acknowledge that reflection has traditionally been understood in terms of a visual paradigm.

Held concisely indicates the connection between this model and the problem of ineluctable anonymity when he notes that I cannot “see” and grasp my own functioning because I am the very source of the grasping regard; the currently functioning I is the origin of the reflective gaze and cannot simultaneously be its terminus: I can never “catch myself in the act” of functioning, for the distance between “seer” and “seen” is essential to the structure of “seeing” per se. And in fact, straightforward experience too is understood in accordance with the same paradigm—since what we experience is the thing we are engaged with, we do not “see” our own currently actual experiencing (3-1/349), and the constitutive performances of this “living life” (lebendiges Leben) remain hidden (11/365; 29/74). We might even say that while the problem of naive anonymity is that it is “blind” to its own functioning, the deeper, uncancellable anonymity opens up precisely because reflection attempts to “see” this operatively func-

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29 Here Husserl is contrasting Erleben/bewußt with Erfahren/gewußt; cf. the discussion of the “lived” and the “known” in 3-1/170 as well as 7/82f.; 34/295; and John B. Brough, “The Most Difficult of all Phenomenological Problems,” Husserl Studies 27 (2011), 28, 36. Similarly, Roman Ingarden, “Die vier Begriffe der Transzendenz und das Problem des Idealismus in Husserl,” Analecta Husserliana 1 (1971), 55f., speaks of “Durchleben” as a living-through-in-awareness that does not require a separate “reflection” (cf. his comments in 1/216), a theme also expressed by Paul Ricoeur, Le volontaire et l’involontaire, Paris, Aubier, 1950, Part I, Chapter 1, 2,3, in terms of a non-alienating self-awareness that is not separated from or subsequent to the act itself.

30 Cf. Mohanty, op. cit., 153ff., for a notion of “reflexivity” that is irreducible to intentionality.

tioning life. But must this inevitably be the case? Does reflection always open up a
temporal distance between the act of reflecting and the subjective life reflected up-
on? Must we assume that “thematization” is inherently opposed to “operativity”?33

Let us return to the subjectivity of acts, taking kinaesthetic consciousness as our
leading clue. As Landgrebe points out, in kinaesthetic experience we “know” our
movement as our own, but not through “reflection”; instead, there is an immediate
certainty of performing this act during the performing itself (rather than merely an
awareness of it after the fact).34 Similarly, Levinas asks, “Does my realization of the
movement of my hand (...) present the same structure as the consciousness of the
ego-cogito-cogitatum?”—and he goes on to suggest that such kinaesthetic con-
sciousness is not only as legitimate as Cartesian consciousness, but undermines the
latter’s hegemony.35 In visual experience, we are restricted to one perspective at a
time, seen from a single ideal vanishing point located somewhere in the head, behind
the eyes (16/227f.; 3-1/350), in such a way that the seen is essentially over-against and
separate from the seeing subject, with a central zone of focus privileged over the rest
of a visual field (22/275f., 416f.) wherein we see only surfaces, for breaking an object
apart to see its interior yields only a further set of surfaces (HM8/358). In contrast, ki-
naesthetic experience is “polyphonic,” as it were, allowing movement to be initiated
simultaneously in several kinaesthetic systems; such movement may often run off non-
actionally and remain unthematic, but it is also possible for me to be “awake for” my
own movement (HM8/328; 39/904), suffusing it with awareness and living its depths
from within, including the way in which a particular local gesture entails adjustments
elsewhere in the kinaesthetic system as a whole. I can even find myself caught up in a
movement shared with others, with my own kinaesthetic life pervaded by and contrib-
uting to the texture of a broader interkinaesthetic community (again, lived from within
as a participant rather than appearing over-against me as an object to an observer).36
Moreover, although I can indeed remember a past movement or savor the feel of a

32 Mickunas, op. cit., 257.
33 Natalie Depraz, “What about the praxis of Reduction? Between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty,” in
Merleau-Ponty’s Reading of Husserl, Ted Toadvine and Lester Embree (Eds.), Dordrecht, Kluwer, 2002,
121.
35 Emmanuel Levinas, Discovering Existence with Husserl, Evanston, Northwestern University Press,
36 See Behnke, “Interkinaesthetic affectivity,” op. cit., especially § 3, for more on the style of aware-
ness at stake here.
current one, kinaesthetic consciousness—like capability-consciousness in general—does not suffer the fate of always arriving too late to catch one’s own functioning in the act, but is essentially future-oriented whenever it comes into action. Here, however, it is important to note that capability-consciousness per se is not a matter of the temporally individuated enactment of a certain possibility that can then be reflected upon subsequently, but commands, for example, a “practical kinaesthetic horizon” (11/15, and cf. 15/619; 39/366f., 372, 624), an ideal and co-present “range” (Spielraum) of possibilities even while which possibility will actually be enacted next (including the possibility of continuing to maintain a particular position at rest) remains indeterminate. A Cartesian approach would require us to transform this vague cluster of possible moves “I could” make from here into something “clear and distinct.” But Husserlian phenomenological description rests on honoring the evidence of what is itself-given in the manner proper to it. Normally, for instance, we would bring the emptily intended to intuitive fulfillment and the vague to a higher degree of clarity—but not if we were investigating the essence of “emptiness” or “vagueness” itself (3-1/141). Likewise, the lability of capability-consciousness as an awareness of a range of future possibilities rather than of a “settled” past is to be respected as essential to this dimension of experiencing. Further investigations would be needed to display the genetic acquisition of capability-consciousness as well as its specific modes of functioning (for instance, “I can always do it again” or “I can no longer do it”). Here, however, it can at least be said that when we become “awake for” or “alive to” our own kinaesthetic capability in its living becoming (cf. 33/137; 39/448), we are gaining phenomenological access to an essential dimension of operatively functioning life, retrieving it from anonymity without making it into an “object” over-against a subject. There are still depths whose ongoing operations are not at our disposal—for example, ultimately functioning primal temporalization. But by adopting the attitude proper to kinaesthetic rather than visual experience, we can at least “live in” and “live through” the incessant welling-up of each new now, “originaliter bewußt” (HM8/7), in the act.

§ 4. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE ISSUES FOR HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY AS A WHOLE

What is accomplished through Husserl’s development of the notion of the operatively functioning? It is, of course, linked with the course of development of his work as a

37 Recall that Husserl uses the expression “I can” in broader senses as well as with regard to kinaesthetic capability (see, for example, 42/306, 370, 375; cf. 481).
whole. For example, he comes to see that active constitution presupposes passive synthesis; he recognizes that the notion of “constitution” itself is not merely a matter of syntheses, but can involve genetic acquisition; and he is able to integrate the work on time-constitution that was set aside in Ideas I (3-1/182) into his account of functioning as a dynamic process. Moreover, when consciousness is seen not as a container but as function/functioning, we are no longer faced with the problem of how the mental “contents” of this supposedly self-contained, “immanent” container can reach something transcendent, and intentionality is understood as world-openness. Yet intentionality is no longer assumed to be the property solely of the “mental”: the notion of constitutively functioning corporeality undermines mind-body dualism. Similarly, the disclosure of the constitutive efficacy of operatively functioning life undermines an ontological subject-object dualism in favor of a methodological understanding of the universal correlational a priori, taken in full concretion—embracing both the performances of subjective life and the achievements of these performances (unities, modes of appearing, horizons, etc.)—as the field of work for phenomenological research (cf. 6/267). Here investigations are to be carried out along all dimensions of experience, from the depths of primal temporalization and affectivity to the generative-intersubjective constitution of historically effective concepts and assumptions whose sedimented styles are to be reactivated and critiqued. In a way, then, the notion of the disclosure of operatively functioning life becomes a title for the entire research program of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology as a rigorous science. And the Crisis is not to be seen as a departure from this program for the sake of celebrating a pregiven lifeworld; instead, it is radically true to the correlational a priori in tracing the “pregiven” to the “pregiving” performances of operatively functioning life. In this way functioning intentionality is actually “nothing other than normal intentionality but as it is disclosed in phenomenological analysis,” and the notion of the ongoing constitutive efficacy of operative functioning is a thoroughly transcendental notion, arising only within the transcendental-phenomenological epochē and reduction. But it is also an eidetic notion, an invariant exhibited along its variations. On the one hand, functioning can be actional, as when I deliberately swing certain kinaesthetic possibilities into play in order to bring certain appearances into view (or exercise any spontaneous I-function), or it can be non-actional, as when the next now wells up without my “doing” anything at all. On the other hand, however, it can be unthemetic, as when I’m running to catch a bus in a ready-made world, or thematic, as when I carry out the radical reduction to the living present (34/185ff.) and live the primal upwelling of time from

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within, or as when I perform the reduction to the hyletic-kinaesthetic (42/39, 47; cf. 39/587) and appreciate the subtle gestures of kinaesthetic receptivity toward the emerging sensuous textures of the world in “transcendental wakefulness” (34/296).

All this, of course, creates a terminological problem, given that the received interpretation understands “functioning” as equivalent to non-actional and anonymous, prereflective and passive, irretrievably unthematic. It seems to me that this interpretation is too entrenched in the literature for me to propose changing the way the term “functioning” is habitually used. For Husserl, however, functioning subjectivity is termed “functioning” because it functions, which refers to its dynamic efficacy, its capability for achieving something. It is true that these performances may proceed non-actionally and without explicit awareness. It is nevertheless possible to thematize operatively functioning life in its dynamic efficacy and to acknowledge that its operations “may” proceed unthematic without insisting that they “must” remain anonymous. And if we accept the possibility of a shift from reflection understood as visual to a transcendental wakefulness according to a kinaesthetic paradigm, we find that Husserl’s descriptions of operatively functioning life harbor a horizon of further phenomenological work to be done.

For example, Antonio Zirión has pointed out that during a certain period in the history of phenomenology in Mexico, Husserl’s work was seen as concentrating on the logical and the cognitive while neglecting our kinaesthetic/affective and emotional life.39 Now, however, it is possible to see that it is precisely the development of the notion of functioning that allows Husserl to root his “transcendental logic” in a new type of “transcendental aesthetics” (17/297). And there is much more descriptive work to be done in the latter domain, particularly with regard to the deep structures of the intercorporeal realm and the ethical implications of the style in which we live out the “collective corporeality” of the “we” (39/181).40 To speak, then, of la vida operativa is not only to enter a conversation already underway, but to propose prolonging the conversation on the basis of further original phenomenological investigations so that we will once again be able to lend our voices to this “mute” life itself, in all of its living complexity, and bring it—as best we can—to the pure expression of its own meaning.41


40 Cf., for example, 42/524, where Husserl indicates that love and its “effective” (sich auswirkenden) intentionality is one of the main problems of phenomenology.

41 1/77; cf. 6/152, 191; HMB/115; 39/447; 34/296. I am indebted to my brother, Jim Behnke, for helping me gain access to some of Husserl’s works in Spanish, and to Rosemary Rizo-Patrón, Agustín Serrano de Haro, and Antonio Zirión for kindly providing me with some of their work.